UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE
BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
In re: |
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Bruce D. Camenzind, d/b/a Clarence E. Camenzind Funnel Trust, BK Farms, and Dixon Ranch, |
P&S-D Docket No. 22-J-0024 |
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Respondent. |
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DECISION AND ORDER WITHOUT HEARING BY
REASON OF DEFAULT
Appearances:
David W. Schaaf,
Esq., with the Office of the General Counsel,
United States Department of Agriculture, Kansas City, MO, for the Complainant, the Deputy Administrator, Fair Trade Practices Program,
Agricultural Marketing Service (“AMS”)
Sam King, Esq., of Patino
King, LLC, Omaha, NE, for the Respondent, Bruce D. Camenzind,
d/b/a Clarence E. Camenzind Funnel Trust, BK Farms,
and Dixon Ranch
Preliminary Statement
This
is a disciplinary proceeding under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as
amended and supplemented (7 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq.)
(“Act”); the regulations promulgated thereunder (9 C.F.R.
§§ 201.1 et seq.) (“Regulations”); and the Rules
of Practice Governing Formal Adjudicatory Proceedings Instituted by the
Secretary Under Various Statutes (7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130 through 1.151)
(“Rules of Practice”).
The
Deputy Administrator, Fair Trade Practices Program, Agricultural Marketing
Service, United States Department of Agriculture (“Complainant”),
initiated this proceeding by filing a complaint against Bruce D. Camenzind, doing business as Clarence E. Camenzind Funnel Trust, BK Farms, and Dixon Ranch
(“Respondent”), on January 25, 2022. The Complaint alleged that
Respondent willfully violated sections 312(a) and 409 of the Act (7 U.S.C.
§§ 213(a) and 228b) and sections 201.29, 201.30, and 201.43 of the
Regulations (9 C.F.R. §§ 201.29, 201.30, and 201.43).[1]
The Complaint requested:
1.
That unless Respondent fails to file an answer
within the time allowed, or admits all the material allegations of this
Complaint, this proceeding be set for an oral hearing in accordance with the
Rules of Practice; and
2.
That an orders be issued requiring Respondent to cease
and desist from the violations of the Act and the regulations found to exist;
suspending Respondent’s registration under the Act for a specified period
and prohibiting Respondent, for a specified period, from engaging in business
in any capacity for which registration and bonding are required under the Act
as stated in 7 U.S.C. § 204; and assessing such civil penalties against
Respondent as are authorized by the Act and warranted by the facts and
circumstances of this case.
Complaint
at 5-6 (emphasis added).
Respondent
was duly served with a copy of the Complaint and did not file an answer within
the twenty-day period as prescribed by section 1.136 of the Rules of Practice
(7 C.F.R. § 1.136).[2]
On
April 5, 2022, I issued an order directing the parties to show cause
(“Show Cause Order”), not later than twenty days after that date,
why default should not be entered against Respondent.[3]
On
April 21, 2022, Complainant responded to the Show Cause Order by filling a Motion
for a Decision Without Hearing by Reason of Default (“Motion for
Default”) and motion and proposed Decision Without Hearing by Reason of
Default (“Proposed Decision”). In addition to requesting a
cease-and-desist order, Complainant now asks that Respondent be assessed a $24,450
civil penalty and be “further suspended as a registrant from all
livestock operations as a dealer for a period of ninety (90) days.”[4]
Respondent
did not reply to my Show Cause Order. However, on May 12, 2022, Respondent
filed an “objection” to Complainant’s Motion for Default
“disput[ing] the
allegations and claims . . . asserted against him in the Motion.”[5]
The Objection provides, in relevant part:
[T]he
civil penalty proposed by the OGC is excessive, unjust, unreasonable
and not supported by the factors which must be considered for civil penalties
under the Act. See 7 U.S.C. § 213. . . [A] penalty of $24,450 will [a]ffect the Respondent’s ‘ability to stay in
business’ as Respondent is an individual and his operations are small and
a fine of this amount may be significant enough to render the Respondent unable
to stay in business.[6]
.
. . OGC’s request to suspend the Respondent for a period of ninety (90)
days from engaging in operations subject to the Act is unjust and unreasonable.
.
. . OGC’s requests for civil penalties and suspension of the Respondent
from engaging in operations under the Act should [not] be decided without a
hearing and opportunity for the Respondent to defend himself against these
requests.
Objection
at 1-2. I find that Respondent’s objections have no merit; they neither
address Respondent’s failure to answer the Complaint nor assert why
default should not be entered.
The
Department’s sanction policy is set forth in S.S. Farms Linn County,
Inc.:[7]
[T]he
sanction policy in each case will be determined by
examining the nature of the violations in relation to the remedial purposes of
the regulatory statute involved, along with all relevant circumstances, always
giving appropriate weight to the recommendations of the administrative
officials charged with the responsibility for achieving the congressional
purpose.
S.S.
Farms Linn County, Inc., 50 Agric. Dec. 476 (U.S.D.A. 1991) (Decision and
Order as to James Joseph Hickey & Shannon Hansen), aff’d sub. nom
Hickey v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 991 F.2d
803 (9th Cir. 1993) (not to be cited as precedent under 9th Cir. R. 36-3). I
find that by failing to answer the Complaint and failing to file meritorious
objections to Complainant’s Motion for Default, Respondent has admitted
the material allegations of the Complaint. Accordingly, I find that
Complainant’s proposed sanctions in this case are warranted[8]
and reasonable under the circumstances.[9]
Failure
to file a timely answer or failure to deny or otherwise respond to allegations
in the Complaint shall be deemed, for purposes of this proceeding, an admission
of the allegations in the Complaint, unless the parties have agreed to a
consent decision.[10]
Other than a consent decision, the Rules of Practice do not provide for
exceptions to the regulatory consequences of an unfiled answer where, as in the
present case, no meritorious objections have been filed.
As
Respondent failed to answer the Complaint, and upon Complainant’s motion
for the issuance of a decision without hearing, this Decision and Order is
issued without further procedure or hearing pursuant to section 1.139 of the
Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139).
Findings
of Fact
1.
Respondent Bruce D. Camenzind,
doing business as Clarence E. Camenzind Funnel Trust,
BK Farms, and Dixon Ranch, is an individual whose current address is in the
State of Nebraska.
2.
At all times material herein, Respondent engaged in the
business of a dealer under the Act and registered with the Secretary of
Agriculture as a Dealer.
3.
On June 24, 2012, and again on October 5, 2018,
Respondent agreed to cease and desist from failing to pay, when due, the full
purchase price of livestock within the time period
required by the Act and Regulations, and from issuing checks without sufficient
funds to cover said check, as required by the Act and Regulations.
4.
Notwithstanding the Consent Decision and Orders,
between August 24, 2019 and October 12, 2019, Respondent purchased forty-five
head of livestock in four transactions from Omaha Red Oak Livestock Market,
Inc., in Red Oak, Iowa, for $36,751.37 and failed to pay, when due, the full
purchase price of such livestock within the time period required by the Act and
the Regulations, and Respondent further issued checks without sufficient funds
in his bank account to cover said checks.
5.
Additionally, Respondent, despite being informed that,
as of April 13, 2019, his bond, necessary to engage in the business of buying
and selling livestock in interstate commerce, would expire, Respondent
continued to act as a dealer buying and selling livestock without an adequate
bond or bond equivalent required by the Act and Regulations.
Conclusions
1.
The Secretary of Agriculture has jurisdiction in this
matter.
2.
By reason of the facts above, Respondent has willfully violated sections 312
of the Act (7 U.S.C. § 213(a)), section 409 of the Act (7 U.S.C. §
228b), and sections 201.29, 201.30, an 201.43 of the
Regulations promulgated thereunder (9 C.F.R. §§ 201.29, 201.30,
201.43).
ORDER
1.
Complainant’s Motion for Default is GRANTED.
2.
Respondent Bruce D. Camenzind,
doing business as Clarence E. Camenzind Funnel Trust,
BK Farms, and Dixon Ranch, his agents and employees, directly or through any
corporate or other device, in connection with operations subject to the Packers
and Stockyards Act, shall cease and desist from engaging in operations subject
to the Act without possessing the bond necessary to engage in the business of
buying and selling livestock in interstate commerce, without paying timely for
each and every livestock transaction and purchase from sellers of livestock,
and from issuing checks without sufficient funds to cover those checks.
3.
Respondent is assessed a civil penalty of $24,450, to
be paid immediately upon the final and effective date of this Order. The
payment shall be sent to the following address:
USDA, Fair Trade
Practices Program
Packers and
Stockyards Division
P.O. Box 790335
St. Louis, MO
63179-0335.
4.
Respondent is further suspended as a registrant from
all livestock operations as a dealer for a period of ninety (90) days.
This
Decision and Order shall be final and effective without further proceedings
thirty-five (35) days after service, unless an appeal
to the Judicial Officer is filed with the Hearing Clerk within thirty (30) days
after service as provided in sections 1.139 and 1.145 of the Rules of Practice
(7 C.F.R. §§ 1.139 and 1.145).
Copies of this
Decision and Order shall be served upon the parties and counsel by the Hearing
Clerk.
Done
at Washington, D.C.,
this 2nd day of June 2022
/s/ |
Channing D. Strother Chief Administrative Law Judge |
Hearing
Clerk’s Office
United
States Department of Agriculture
Stop
9203, South Building, Room 1031
1400
Independence Avenue, SW
Washington,
DC 20250-9203
Tel: 202-720-4443
Fax: 844-325-6940
[1] Complaint at 5.
[2] United States Postal
Service records reflect that the Complaint was sent to Respondent via certified
mail and delivered on February 14, 2022. Respondent had twenty days from the
date of service to file a response. 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). Weekends and
federal holidays shall be included in the count; however, if the due date falls
on a Saturday, Sunday, or federal holiday, the last day for timely filing shall
be the following work day. 7 C.F.R. § 1.147(h). In this case, Respondent’s
answer was due on or before March 7, 2022. Respondent has not filed an answer.
[3] The Show Cause Order also directed: “Unless the
parties have agreed to a consent decision, Complainant’s response shall
be accompanied by: (1) a proposed decision and order and (2) a motion for
adoption of that proposed decision and order in accordance with the provisions
of 7 C.F.R. § 1.139.” Show Cause Order at 2.
[4] Proposed Decision at 3.
[5] Objection at 1. I note that Respondent does not state
he “disputes the allegations and claims” asserted against him in
the Complaint. Id.
[6] While I sympathize with Respondent’s
circumstances, Complainant states that “[t]he Packers and Stockyards
Division has considered whether the penalty is so large that it could [a]ffect
Respondent’s ‘ability to stay in business’” and
“has determined, in light of the size and volume of Respondent’s
business, that a penalty of $24,450 should not prevent Respondent from
maintaining its operations as a dealer.” Motion for Default at 4.
[7] 50 Agric. Dec. 476 (U.S.D.A. 1991) (Decision and
Order as to James Joseph Hickey & Shannon Hansen), aff’d sub. nom
Hickey v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 991 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1993) (not to
be cited as precedent under 9th Cir. R. 36-3).
[8] See Motion for Default at 3-5 (describing the
factors Complainant considered when determining its civil-penalty
recommendation).
[9] See id. at 4-5 (“[A] monetary penalty
and suspension of registration is required to effectuate the Secretary’s
policy of deterrence. Respondent could be liable for up to $252,549 in civil
penalties for its current violations. Considering that the requested penalty is
roughly 9.7 percent of the maximum amount, this is a reasonable penalty under
these circumstances, where Respondent has committed serious violations of the
Act and has been given several prior notices of its violation.”).
[10] 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(c).